Battlefields Trust London & South East

The raising of the Royal Standard at Nottingham on 22 August 1642 signalled the formal beginning of the Civil War. Over the following weeks both sides were busy recruiting and preparing their armies for a conflict which, it was expected, would soon be over, probably decided in one major battle. London was the prize and on 12 October the king left Shrewsbury to try to get ahead of the Earl of Essex's Parliamentarian army, which was at Worcester. This he succeeded in doing, but was pursued by the Parliamentarians and forced to offer battle at Edgehill in Warwickshire on 23 October. The outcome was inconclusive, but the Royalists were able to continue their march, occupying Banbury and Oxford � which became their headquarters - and then pushing on down the Thames valley to take Reading. An attempt to seize Windsor Castle failed, but the king was prepared to leave it in his rear and continue the advance on London. At Colnbrook he received a delegation from Parliament as a preliminary move towards attempting to achieve a negotiated settlement. Despite this, the Royalists attacked Brentford on 12 November, defeated the two regiments that were posted to defend it and then sacked the town.

The attack upon the Parliamentarian regiments at Brentford came as a surprise in London, especially as the negotiations with the king were continuing and Parliament was prepared to agree to a truce. News of the attack arrived while the House of Commons was sitting and the response was prompt and effective. Earlier reports questioning the commitment of members of the militia and stressing the extent of Royalist support within the capital proved to have been misleading, and the city's forces were mobilised without difficulty.[1] That Saturday night in the City was 'a troublossom Night the Carts carying magazen all night & morning'.[2] Essex's army, too, responded promptly. Although morale was said to have been low in the return to London after Edgehill - some soldiers had abandoned their weapons during the march - he had kept his army intact and placed it to the west of the city to meet any Royalist threat.[3]

The army was now reinforced by the London Trained Bands and auxiliaries under the command of Philip Skippon, together with a force of 3,000 men recruited by the Earl of Warwick, and 2,000 sailors from the fleet.[4] The presence of a hostile army so close to the capital also put the Members of both Houses of Parliament's prominent supporters on their mettle. They could not be seen to be unwilling to appear in arms in the face of such an imminent danger and so Essex was joined by many gentlemen volunteers and leading citizens, some of whom formed their own troops. The army also had support and encouragement from Londoners, fearful that a victorious cavalier army would sack the city. Their resolve had no doubt been stiffened by an effective campaign from the pulpits and in the newsbooks and pamphlets over the previous few weeks, vilifying the Royalists generally and Prince Rupert in particular as cruel plunderers and papists. News of the sack of Brentford confirmed their worst fears and, urged on by the preachers on the Sunday morning, they gave so many provisions for the troops that almost a hundred cart-loads were taken to the army, including 'great store' of beer and wine.[5]

By 8 o'clock on Sunday morning Essex's army of about 24,000 men was concentrated at Turnham Green on the Great West Road. The Earl of Clarendon described it as 'a full army of horse and foot, fit to have decided the title of a crown'.[6] The regiments of the Trained Bands and auxiliaries were alternated with those of the army. Some foot regiments formed a reserve and Sir Phillip Stapleton's and Colonel Goodwin's regiments of horse were in the van, with the other horse regiments on the flanks. The horse probably numbered no more than 3,000 men, plus an unknown number of dragoons.[7] The addition to the army of the City forces, sailors and other volunteers produced the unusually high proportion of foot. Both Essex and Skippon were conspicuous in going from regiment to regiment, encouraging the troops.[8] A detachment of 3,000 men under Sir James Ramsay was withdrawn from Kingston, where they were posted to defend the bridge, but to join the army they had to march on the south side of the Thames, cross London Bridge and then out of the city. Not until the following week was a bridge of boats constructed at Putney to speed up troop movements between the two sides of the river.

The royalists brought up the remainder of the army behind the advance guard which had captured Brentford. Nevertheless, the King had only about 12,000 men, probably matching the parliamentarians in the number of horse, but with far fewer infantry. Unlike the parliamentarians, they were operating in a largely hostile area and were short of supplies. The horse, in particular, were forced to live off the land, alienating the country people by taking food and fodder, and also seizing wagon-loads of cloth being taken to London from the West Country.[9]

In the 1640s 100 acres of Turnham Green lay within the parish of Chiswick and perhaps a further thirty acres in Acton.[10] The modern open spaces of Turnham Green, Chiswick Back Common, Acton Common and Acton Green are the remnants of Turnham Green, although it was rather more extensive in the seventeenth century than the overall area now covered by them would suggest. On the north side were hedged fields on the rising ground towards Acton common field, with the village of Acton beyond that, and there were also enclosures on the west side of the green, towards the riverside village of Strand on the Green, and on the east, towards Hammersmith. In some accounts of the battle, Acton was confused with Brentford.

The Great West Road, lined with small cottages and a windmill, ran across Turnham Green. On the south side of the green was Chiswick common field, extending almost to the village of Chiswick and St Nicholas's church, on the Thames, and the walled gardens of the Jacobean Chiswick House. In 1662 the Dutch artist William Schellinks described Chiswick as lying 'in a great plain'.[11] This was the open space formed by Turnham Green, Acton Green and Chiswick common field; the site of the battlefield. The green alone was far too small to contain the two armies. Even so, the Parliamentarian front must have been tightly packed. The Royalists had the opposite problem; they could not match the Parliamentarians' frontage, so much so that the Parliamentarian horse extended beyond their left wing, which was in danger of being outflanked.[12] Prince Rupert was given credit for the skill of his dispositions, which disguised the extent of the Royalists' numerical weakness. Despite that weakness, the two armies numbered at least 36,000 men. Not since the battle of Towton in 1461 had so many troops been assembled on a British battlefield, and Essex's army was the largest that either side deployed on a battlefield during the Civil War with the sole exception of the three armies combined at Marston Moor, which together numbered 28,000 men.

The Parliamentarians occupied the east side of the battlefield, with their front extending from the modern South Parade, on the fringe of Bedford Park, to the garden walls of Chiswick House. Musketeers placed in the gardens would have secured their left flank. Beyond the house was an expanse of meadows that was unsuitable for troop movements, especially so late in the year, and any attempt to cross them would have been countered relatively easily before a party of troops could reach Chiswick village. The Royalist front probably ran from Acton Green across the modern Turnham Green and close to the line of Sutton Court Road as far south as the Bollo Brook. The gardens of Sutton Court on the south side of the brook - at the junction of the modern Fauconberg Road and Sutton Court Road - would have given cover for troops protecting the right flank. The Parliamentarian front probably extended for 1,200 yards; the Royalists' line was rather shorter. This notional disposition of the fronts places them roughly 550 yards apart; a contemporary account describes them as being separated by about half a mile.[13]

Royalist troops advanced on to the rising ground towards Acton, presumably to secure the army's left flank. Either to counter this, or as part of his own strategy, Essex sent two regiments of horse and four of foot around the north side of the battlefield, between Turnham Green and Acton. The Royalists were too short of men to prevent the manoeuvre and, although their foot lining the hedges inflicted casualties on the Parliamentarians, they had to withdraw. Having occupied the high ground Colonel Hampden sent to Essex for two pieces of artillery, but he refused and indeed recalled the whole detachment, which had covered about a mile, to rejoin the main army.[14] Had they continued their march they would not only have commanded the Royalist left but have had the opportunity to turn south towards the Thames in the vicinity of the modern Kew Bridge, trapping the Royalist army between it and Essex's force.

After the withdrawal of the Parliamentarian detachment the two sides continued to face each other until mid-afternoon, although some skirmishing occurred, with parties of troops advancing towards the enemy, but whether getting close enough to exchange musket fire is unclear. It was a confined battlefield, with enclosures on three sides and gardens and meadows on the fourth, giving little scope for the effective use of cavalry. One account describes troops of Royalist horse riding towards the Parliamentarian foot, probably as feints, to test their resolution and perhaps causing enough confusion among the inexperienced soldiers for them to break their ranks and give the horse an opportunity to burst in.[15] An attack on unbroken lines of pikemen and musketeers would have been bound to fail; on the other hand it would have been out of character for Rupert not to have attempted something of this kind, to try to end the deadlock.

Essex's foot had performed well at Edgehill, but he may have been doubtful about the reliability of some other sections of the foot in combat, especially the Trained Bands, auxiliaries and volunteers, and was not prepared to risk defeat by weakening his main body, hence his recall of the six regiments. Gunpowder was in short supply and some of the weapons delivered to the Parliamentarian forces had been defective. Such problems would have contributed to Essex's caution. The Royalists, too, were short of ammunition.[16]

Essex had the advantage of operating very close to his base, which could provide supplies and recruits throughout the day. This had two disadvantages, however. One was that a number of Members of both Houses of Parliament who came from Westminster attached themselves to his entourage. The Earl of Holland was actively involved in the deployment of the army. Essex had to take into account their advice and that of his senior officers who were professional soldiers. This may explain the change of tactics, in sending the sizeable contingent to pass around the Royalist left flank and later withdrawing it. The professional soldiers were later accused of acting selfishly by urging a cautious approach rather than an attack on the Royalist position, because they did not want the war to end so soon, bringing their employment to a premature end. The Members of Parliament, on the other hand, were said to have favoured an attack. But the Parliamentarian commanders were also suspected of not engaging the Royalists to give the king the opportunity to leave his army and ride across to Essex and his officers, to be escorted back to Whitehall to resume negotiations.[17]

A second problem was caused by the hundreds of onlookers in the rear of the army, who had come out of London either out of curiosity to witness such a major event, or to get the earliest possible warning should the battle go against Essex. When parties of soldiers advanced towards the enemy, or the soldiers gave a shout, they took alarm and rode quickly off towards London, unsettling the troops to such an extent as to cause some desertions.[18] But Parliamentarian accounts stress the high morale of their forces, who were 'full of corage and sange psalmes all day', and nothing occurred to encourage Royalist hopes of a numerous fifth-column in the ranks of Essex's army.[19]

The battle of Turnham Green became a stalemate. Essex was content to block the Royalists' further progress towards London and Rupert was too weak numerically to risk a frontal assault on, or to outflank, the Parliamentarian positions. If his cavalry had driven back their opponents they would have been exposed to musket fire from the hedgerows around the battlefield, where the Parliamentarian troops were so numerous that they could form a continuous line behind the hedges. The artillery, protected by earthworks, was placed to cover the Great West Road and the other roads running from the battlefield.[20]

During the afternoon there was an exchange of artillery fire. This seems to have been ineffective on both sides. The Royalist guns were sited on relatively high ground and so their shot carried over the enemy lines, and the Parliamentarian bombardment was said to have killed just a few horses, although the London pamphlets claimed greater success.[21] Towards dusk Rupert drew off his army, skilfully using his troops to cover the removal of the artillery and protecting the foot with a screen of cavalry. As the Royalists withdrew, he deployed the horse between Old and New Brentford, to give the remainder of the army time to withdraw, and the Parliamentarian guns were brought up to dislodge them.[22] They fired at the Royalist ranks and Essex consulted with his senior officers to decide whether to press the attack, but they were afraid of being drawn into confused fighting among the enclosures in the growing darkness and the Royalists were able to retire without further fighting.[23]

There seem to have been few casualties on either side and most accounts do not give the numbers. A Parliamentarian report referred to more than 800 Royalist dead on the battlefield and 120 of Essex's army being killed, but there is no other evidence for casualties on such a scale and the figures are implausibly high, given the extent of the action.[24] No special arrangements were made for the care of the Parliamentarian wounded, suggesting that the numbers were small.

The Royalists then crossed the Thames at Kingston and occupied the town, threatening the possibility of an attack on London from the south or a movement to link up with their supporters in Kent, with the prospect of an interruption of traffic on the river below London. They were too weak to attempt either manoeuvre, although their incursions into Surrey over the following few days were alarming and gave further justification for the Parliamentarian writers' accusations of plundering. Essex was content to have checked the Royalists' advance on the north side of the Thames and did not attempt to pursue their army.

Parliament's supporters had the greater reason to be disappointed with the outcome, given the numerical superiority of its army, which was fighting so close to its base, and the prospect that the aborted enveloping manoeuvre could have resulted in the complete defeat of the Royalist army and the end of the war almost at its outset. Unlike the aftermath of Edgehill, with conflicting accounts and interpretations, the events at Turnham Green were quickly known. Initially blame was directed at the professional soldiers, but the Parliamentarian commanders' conduct of the battle merged into the growing resentment of Essex and his adherents and their alleged reluctance to defeat the king, leading to the Self Denying Ordinance and the foundation of the New Model Army in 1645.[25]

On the Royalist side, some thought that at Turnham Green they had missed their best opportunity to win the war, by not attacking an inexperienced army containing many soldiers of doubtful loyalty. The defeat of Essex's army would have been followed by a successful march on London and the return of the king to his capital in triumph, able to impose a settlement of his choosing on his political opponents and quell the rebellion among its citizens. John Gwyn, who was with the king's army, later wrote that this was unrealistic, given the Royalists' numerical inferiority and the shrewd placement of the Parliamentarian troops and artillery.[26] Clarendon, too, disagreed with this view and thought that a Royalist attack would have been 'a madness', and Thomas Hobbes justified the king's withdrawal by explaining that he was opposed by 'a most complete and numerous army'.[27] Even had they defeated Essex's army at Turnham Green, they would have been engaged in a running fight through enclosed country towards the city, which was protected by newly erected strong points mounting artillery, with the streets behind them blocked by barricades.

The Battlefield Today
Almost all of the battlefield is built over, although a number of open spaces remain and the Great West Road, now the A315, probably follows the same alignment as in the seventeenth century. Through Chiswick it is designated

Chiswick High Road and runs along the north side of Turnham Green, one of the residual parts of the common and roughly the centre of the royalist position. From its north-west corner, Acton Lane leads past Chiswick Park station to Acton Green Common and Acton Green, the site of the royalist left flank. To the north is the high ground rising towards Acton. Reached from Beaconsfield Road, Acton Lane and Fletcher Road, the railway bridges at South Acton station and Church Path provide vantage points which give an impression of the topography. Returning to Acton Green, the path at the end of Hardwicke Road leads to bridges over the District and Piccadilly lines of the London Underground network to Bridge Street, Belmont Road and Turnham Green.

Running south from Turnham Green to the side of Chiswick town hall is Sutton Court Road, which roughly follows the line of the royalist positions. To the south of the modern A4, Chesterfield Road is on the line of the Bollo Brook. Beyond, at the junction with Fauconberg Road, is the site of Sutton Court. The house was bought in 1676 by Thomas Belasyse, Viscount Fauconberg, and his wife Mary, daughter of Oliver Cromwell. Mary and her sister Elizabeth are buried in St Nicholas's, Chiswick, close to the Thames, and, according to the son of the rector who examined their vault when the church was rebuilt in 1882, it holds a third coffin, perhaps containing Oliver's body.

From Chesterfield Road a walk through Chiswick House grounds leads to the Palladian villa. The Jacobean house was demolished in 1788. The garden on the north-west side of the villa covers roughly the area of the walled enclosure of the Jacobean house and indicates the extent of its gardens in this area. This is the probable end of the parliamentarian left flank. Jacobean gate pillars within the gardeners' yards behind the conservatory may be in situ. From that section of the Duke's Avenue within the grounds, a subway beneath the A4 connects with Duke's Avenue, which joins Chiswick High Road probably a little to the west of the parliamentarian front. On the north side of the High Road, Windmill Road leads to Chiswick Back Common, one of the residual parts of Turnham Green and the site of the parliamentarian right wing. On the north side of the railway lines here is Acton Common, or Acton South Common. The line of South Parade on its north side may be close to the original edge of Turnham Green, and so the limit of the Parliamentarian right flank. Paths across the common lead to Acton Green, completing a circuit of the battlefield.

References
[1] Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, 1642-1643, pp.181,188,201-2.
[2] British Library (BL), Add MS 40,883, f.49r.
[3] The Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow 1625-1672, ed. C.H.Firth, I, Oxford, 1894, p.46. Commons' Journals, II, p.849.
[4] Walter Yonge's Diary of Proceedings in the House of Commons 1642-1645, ed. Christopher Thompson, II, 1986, p.97.
[5] BL, Thomas Tracts (TT), E127/21 A Continuation of Certain Speciall and Remarkable Passages, 12-18 Nov. 1642. The Diary of Bulstrode Whitelocke 1605-1675, ed. Ruth Spalding, 1990, p.141.
[6] Edward Earl of Clarendon, The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England, 1839, I, p.341.
[7] Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, 1642-1643, p.198.
[8] Diary of Bulstrode Whitelocke, pp.139-40.
[9] Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, 1642-1643, p.197. BL, TT, E127/4 The Last Newes from the Kings Majesties Army, 1642, p.3; E127/6 An Extract of Severall Letters , 1642, p.5.
[10] Bodleian Library, MS Rawlinson, D715.
[11] The Journal of William Schellinks' Travels in England 1661-1663, ed. Maurice Exwood and H.L.Lohmann, Camden Soc. 5th series, I, 1993, p.81.
[12] The Military Memoirs of John Gwyn, ed. Norman Tucker, 1967, p.47.
[13] BL, TT, E127/21 A Continuation
[14] Diary of Bulstrode Whitelocke., p.140. Walter Yonge's Diary, p.113.
[15] BL, TT, E127/15 A true and perfect Relation of the chiefe Passages in Middlesex, 1642.
[16] Diary of Bulstrode Whitelocke., p.141. Walter Yonge's Diary, p.112.
[17] Diary of Bulstrode Whitelocke., p.141. BL, TT, E127/35 Speciall Passages, 15-22 Nov. 1642, p.126.
[18] Diary of Bulstrode Whitelocke., p.140.
[19] Walter Yonge's Diary, p.113.
[20] Military Memoirs of John Gwynn, p.47.
[21] BL, TT, E127/15 A true and Perfect relation. E242/19 England's Memorable Accidents, p.82. E127/35 Speciall Passages, p.126. Clarendon, History of the Rebellion, p.341.
[22] BL, TT, E242/19 England's Memorable Accidents, 14-20 Nov. 1642, p.82.
[23] Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow, I, pp.47-8.
[24] BL, TT, E127/15 A true and Perfect relation.
[25] Bodleian Library, MS Don c.184,f.29r. Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow, I, p.47. Memoirs of the Life of Colonel Hutchinson, ed. James Sutherland, Oxford, 1973, p.60.
[26] Military Memoirs of John Gwynn, p.47.
[27] Clarendon, History of the Rebellion, p.341. Thomas Hobbes, Behemoth or The Long Parliament, ed Ferdinand Tönnies, 1889, p.122.

Written by Stephen Porter 30 April 2003